讲座题目：Venture Capitalist Directors and Managerial Incentives

主讲嘉宾：刘夏

美国里士满大学Robins商学院金融系助理教授

讲座时间：2024年5月23日（周四）15:00

讲座地点：金融学院116教室

嘉宾简介

刘夏，博士毕业于美国俄克拉荷马大学Price商学院金融系, CFA持证人。研究领域为实证公司金融，主要方向包括高管薪酬，国有企业，风险投资等，研究成果发表在Journal of Banking and Finance等期刊。

摘要

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (VC directors) on executive incentives at non-venture-backed public firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (delta). These effects are more substantial if VC directors are from highly reputable VC firms. Using availability of direct flights to VC hub cities and annual estimates of VC dry powder per industry as instruments, we show that these results are causal. In addition, VC directors are more focused on growth performance goals in CEO compensation contracts. We also document that prior finding of greater research intensity and innovation when VC directors serve on boards of public firms is partly explained by increased risk-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly, we find that having VC directors on nominating and/or governance committees is associated with a higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover.